Firm-level data of 23 public telephone firms from less developed countries is used to compare the operating performance under private and state control in the period 1986-2001. Fixed-effects estimation indicates that privately controlled firms exhibit higher productive efficiency than their state counterparts after controlling for monopoly conditions, income level, and the scale of the fixed telephone network. This strongly supports the property rights theory of the firm even under the limited private property protection that less developed countries offer. On the other hand, public telephone firms that face competition on basic services and from wireless firms tend to exhibit higher productive efficiency than those that do not. Contrary to a common view, no evidence is found of higher profits among privately controlled telephone firms, while as expected monopoly status is strongly related with higher profits. Finally, privately controlled telephone firms exhibit higher investment growth than state controlled. JEL Classification: D2, L33, L96.
Introduction
The worldwide privatizations of the 1990s have revived a long debate about the impact of alternative ownership arrangements on productive efficiency. The property rights theory of the firm (Alchian 1965 , Alchian 1969 , Furubotn and Pejovich 1972 stresses that in state-owned enterprises, the citizens (the owners), have only weak property rights. These rights are compulsory and non-transferable which shields stateowned firms, and not for profit organizations from the rigor of capital markets and takeover threat. Therefore, weak rights reduce the incentive of owners to monitor and discipline management performance, increases manager's consumption of perquisites lowering firm's productive efficiency. More recent work by Shleifer and Vishny (1994) ; Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny (1996); and Shleifer (1998) extend the property rights theory of the firm and postulate that politicians use state-owned enterprises as a mechanism to transfer resources to their preferred constituents or supporters. The important insight of this is that it explains why state-owned firms exist in the first place.
In this view, the manager of a state-controlled firm becomes the agent of the politician. Therefore, the manager's objective function includes political arguments that make his or her decisions diverge from the profit maximizing solution.
A different source of inefficiency was identified in the seminal works of Alchian and Kessel (1962) , Williamson (1963) , Leibenstein (1966) , and Comanor and Leibenstein (1969) : The lack of competition in the product market could be a major source of productive inefficiency, also known as X-inefficiency. Williamson (1963) and later Hart (1983) formalized this concept in a model of managerial slack. This paper tests the significance of these two sources of inefficiency (state control and lack of competition) using firm-level data of public telephone firms from less developed countries. In this article the term "public" as in "public telephone firm" is not used to imply state ownership, nor private ownership, but rather to refer to the dominant fixed telephony provider.
Empirical work in the United States and other high income countries tend to support the property rights thesis: private firms have higher productive efficiency than state-owned (or non-for profit) firms facing similar competitive environments (i.e. Davies 1971; Frech III 1976; Crain and Zardkoohi 1978) . These early studies used firms in a single industry and a single country. In more recent years, especially after the privatization wave of the late 1980s and 1990s, studies have used cross-country and multiple industry firms to compared pre and post privatization performance. The results indicate that the sale of equity shares to private investors improves firm's operating efficiency and profitability (Megginson, Nash, and Van Randenborgh 1994; Boubakri and Cosset 1998; D'Souza and Megginson 1999; La Porta and Lopez-De-Silanes 1999) .
On the other hand, studies by Caves and Christensen (1980) , and Anderson, Lee, and Murrel (2000) found that competition and not privatization is the key factor influencing the operating efficiency of firms.
In the context of telecommunications; Boylaud and Nicoletti (2000) also found that competition and not privatization is associated with higher productive efficiency in 23 countries from the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development. Ros (1999) used a sample of 110 countries for the period 1986-95 and found that privatization of the public telephone operator is positively related with a higher level of network expansion and labor productivity. Using a similar approach for 30 African and Latin American countries, Wallsten (2001) found that the level of network expansion is positively related with competition from mobile telephony, and to a lesser degree with privatization. All of these studies use data at the industry-level. Unlike them, this article uses firm-level data to compare the operating performance under different ownership and competitive conditions. In this sense it is closer to a recently published article by Bortolotti, D'Souza, Fantini, and Megginson (2002) which also use firm-level data from 31 public telephony firms, the majority from high-income countries. Unlike Bortolotti et al (2002) , only firms from less developed countries are used in this article. Some authors have expressed doubts about the superiority of private ownership over state ownership in the context of less developed countries.
1 Due to the inherently weaker private property rights in less developed countries, this test of the property rights theory of the firm is under the most stringent conditions. In addition, privatization and competition are defined in markedly different way. In this article, privatization is defined in terms of who controls management decisions and not on when the first public offer of shares occurred.
The later approach led Bortolotti et al (2002) to classify firms such as PT Telekomunikasi (Indonesia), Korea Telecom, and Telekom Malaysia as being privatized in 1995, 1993 and 1990 respectively. 2 However, as we will see later, the government still controls all of these firms. 3 Competition is also defined differently; past studies have used the number of wireless firms as proxy for competition (Wallsten 2001; Bortolotti et al 2002) . Here monopoly is defined in terms of whether the customers have a choice among two or more basic telephone service (fixed local telephony, national long-distance, and international telephony) providers. A variable to indicate competition from wireless firms is also included. Moreover, competition is defined in terms of when the entry actually occurred, and not on the date a firm was licensed. A time lag of one or two years between receiving the license and the launch of service is not uncommon.
Using data from 23 public telephone firms and panel data estimation with country fixed-effects this study finds that profitability (measured by the return on sales, the return on assets, and the return on equity) is not higher under private control than under state control. Indeed many state-controlled firms have been highly profitable. As expected, monopoly in basic telephony services is associated with higher profitability regardless of firm control. More important however, productive efficiency (measured by labor productivity) is positively related to private control and negatively related to monopoly provision of basic services. This supports both the property rights theory of the firm and the notion that product market competition reduces managerial slack. These results are fairly strong as they are obtained after controlling for competition from wireless firms, and for the scale of the fixed line network. Finally, evidence is also found on a positive relation between private control and the growth rate of fixed investment.
Overview of the changing telecommunications industry
Before starting with the analysis, the reader may find useful an overview of the environment in which these heavily regulated firms operate. A detailed explanation is out of the scope of this article. However, a rapid recount may serve to illustrate three of the most important changes that occurred in past years: 1) A trend towards transferring control of the public telephone firm to a private corporation; 2) Increased competition in telephony services; and 3) Changes in price regulation.
Control of the public telephone firm
Most Latin American and Eastern European countries in our sample transferred control of the public telephone firm to a private corporation following a competitive process. In East Asia, the public telephone firms' shares were sold in small tranches through several public offers, but the government did not transfer management control.
In 1990 
Competition
With the exception of Chile, Guatemala and Poland, the other countries in our sample granted the privatized firms exclusive rights in the provision of basic telephony services (local fixed telephony, long-distance, and international telephony) for a number of years.
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In East Asia, countries where the state retains control of the public telephone firm have made considerable progress in fostering competition in basic services. Korea pioneered this trend when in 1991 DACOM entered the market for international service.
In Malaysia the incumbent has faced competition on fixed local telephony since 1995.
An often neglect issue is the increasing competitive force exerted by wireless telephony over fixed telephony. As the price of wireless telephony decline, wireless service has increasingly become a substitute for fixed telephony in less developed countries (Sung, Kim, and Lee 2000) . As we will see later, increased competition in basic and wireless telephony services tend to increase the public telephone firm's efficiency.
Price regulation
In less developed countries, the pre-privatization years were characterized by discretionary rate setting procedures. 10 In recent years and especially after privatization, the rate setting procedure had become more transparent. Four rate setting approaches are commonly used: Price caps, rate of return, benchmark regulation, and no regulation as in Guatemala since 1996. The price cap method was mostly adopted in countries that transferred managerial control of the public telephone firm to a private corporation.
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However, this method was not implemented immediately; a process called rate rebalancing was used during the exclusive period that followed most privatizations.
Application of price cap regulation is just starting as the exclusive periods are ending. In
Chile, benchmark regulation (a variation of rate of return) was introduced in 1987 when the public telephone firms were still under state control. The likely influence of these diverse rate setting methods on the performance of the public telephone firm is difficult to assess. Methods to estimate cost functions and the discretionary power of the regulator vary across countries. More over, in many countries the same method was applied differently. For example, rate rebalancing was implemented in Peru as agreed in the concession contract of Telefonica International, however, in the Czech Republic this process was delayed as the SPT faced strong political opposition to rebalance its tariffs.
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In Venezuela, in 1999 the government imposed a freeze on rate increases violating procedures established in the concession contract. 13 Thus, seemingly equal methods of price regulation across countries may hide important changes in the way they are applied.
In Korea for example, basic service rates are regulated by rate of return. However, the government allows price flexibility in those services where the firm does not hold market power. Each year, based on revenue thresholds per service, the government asses which firm holds market power in what services. For example, in 1998 Korea Telecom was deemed as having market power in local telephony but not in long-distance or international service. Thus, only its local telephony prices were subject to regulation that left all other services unregulated. 14 Given these shortcomings, it was decided not to include indicators of price regulation in the analysis and focus on the impact of competition and private control on the operating performance of the public telephone firms.
The data
The sample consists of 23 public telephone firms from less developed countries.
High-income countries were deliberately excluded as several studies exist using firms in developed countries. Moreover, as data from firms in high-income countries is easier to obtain than from less developed countries, including this data will cause the results to be dominated by the larger number of observations from high-income countries. 
Econometric model
Each of the nine performance indicators is used as dependent variables in the following regression equation using panel data and country fixed effects:
Where:
Y it : A vector of observations of firm "i" at time "t" of a performance indicator.
α i : A vector of parameters for each of the "j" countries.
β : A vector of coefficients for each of the "k" exogenous variables.
D jt : A matrix of dummy variables for each firm "i" in country "j" at time "t".
X it : A matrix of observations of firm "i" at time "t" of a set of "k" exogenous variables.
ε it : A vector of error terms of firm "i" at time "t". Table 1 lists all independent variables. The dummy for high inflation (INF50) is included because prices of basic telephony services are regulated and cannot change as fast as inflation. Typically the telephone firm needs approval from the industry regulator to change its prices. It is common to have a pre-established frequency (i.e quarterly, annually, etc.) for price reviews. In a highly inflationary environment, delays on the approval process would harm the firms' profits as output prices fall in real terms. Even if regulation allows prices to be adjusted by inflation at pre-specified intervals, the firm's management would need to estimate the expected inflation for the next period and incorporate this into its current price schedule. Any discrepancy between expected and actual inflation will cause the approved price to differ from the profit maximizing level.
With high inflation, variance on the rate of inflation becomes large which compounds the harmful effects on profits.
The dummy variable for private control (PRIVATE) is defined based on who controls the firms' management decisions. Privately controlled firms are expected to have higher productive efficiency than state controlled due to stronger property rights that reduce principal-agent problems.
A dummy variable (MONFX2) is used to control for monopoly provision of basic services. The dummy takes the value of one if the firm is the monopoly provider of fixed local telephony plus at least one more basic service (i.e. long-distance or international service). This definition seem appropriate since local fixed telephony represents the bulk
[ Table 1 about here] of revenues, thus any two basic services such as local fixed plus long-distance will account for 70 to 80 percent of total revenues for a monopoly provider. 18 Monopoly conditions exist when customers in the main market are not able to choose between two or more service providers. 19 The main market is defined as either of the two largest cities in the area in which the firm is licensed. 20 Being a monopoly is expected to be associated with higher profits.
According to Dixit and Pindyck (1994, p. 3-29) uncertainty over future prices exerts a powerful incentive to delay investment. For regulated firms in less developed countries, uncertainty is heavily influenced by how likely are governments to behave opportunistically. A high expropriation risk would delay investment and network growth.
Countries that constrain the executive branch from arbitrary behavior induce more private investment (Levy and Spiller, 1996, p.1-6) . This argument could be extended to state- One way in which private control may lead to higher investment growth is if it results in higher profitability. In this case, the firm's internal sources of finance would increase, and the cost of capital should decline. 23 Assuming profitable opportunities exist, the firm will expand. But these opportunities not always exist; faced with a deep recession, management will maximize firm's value by selling assets not expanding. "In this sense the behavior of the firm is like the behavior of a market; i.e., the outcome of a complex equilibrium process." (Jensen and Meckling, 1976:311) The following variables are used to control for country specific characteristics:
income per capita, GDP growth rate, and the degree of urbanization. Other variables include dummies to control for telephone firms that also provide wireless service (WIREL), and for those that face competition from wireless firms (WIRECOM). A time trend is included in the efficiency regressions to account for unobserved technological changes. A time trend was also included in the profitability regressions for two reasons:
First; there is a general trend toward increased competition in the telephone industry, and this may affect profits. The dummy variables for monopoly on basic services may not capture fully this trend. Second; most of the observations of the privately controlled firms are in the later half of the period under study (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) . If competition increases with time this may weight the profitability results against private firms. Finally, in the growth regressions, the ratio of wireless to fixed subscribers in the country is included.
As firms assess the prospects of investing millions of dollars in their network, they have to account for medium and long-term effects of changes in consumers' preferences and in the availability of new wireless services. This ratio is used as a proxy for those changes.
Equation eleven was used with each of the nine performance indicators as dependent variables. Each equation was estimated using panel data with country fixed effects. In regressions were heteroskedastic and autocorrelated errors exist, Newey-West robust covariance matrix is used (Newey and West, 1987; Greene, 1997, p. 504-6) . In those where only heteroskedasticity is detected, White heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors are used.
Profitability
A simple inspection of the average rate of return on sales and return on assets indicates that privately controlled firms have a slightly higher profitability than statecontrolled ( or explicit target rate of return. Thus, no matter who controls the firm, and how inefficient their operation is, prices are set at a level that makes the target rate of return likely. Moreover, the economic theory of regulation (Peltzman 1976) , provides a range of equilibrium profits between the competitive and monopoly levels. The final equilibrium outcome will depend on the firm's profit function and the regulator's objective function.
[ Table 3 about here]
An alternative explanation of the "no results" of private control would be if following privatization, telephone firms increased their investment significantly. Thus, firm's operating costs will increase as they devote larger amount of resources to expand their network in hope for increased future sales. As we will see later, there is some support for this explanation as privately controlled telephone firms exhibit higher growth rate of investment in the period studied.
As expected, monopoly provision of basic services is significantly related to higher profitability. Moreover, its effect on profits is large. The return on sales of monopoly telephone firms is expected to be 9 percentage points higher than those facing Dividends can only be paid out of profits after providing for capital expenditures that cannot be supported by borrowings. Government policy on the future of telecommunications in Belize will be the driving force that dictates the amount of dividend that you will receive."
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Our results confirm that high inflation is significantly related to lower profitability. This helps explain the dismal profitability of CPT and ENTEL-Peru in the late 1980s and the case of ENTEL-Argentina (Shaikh et al, 1996, p. 76, 90) all of which were monopolies but operated in an extremely high inflationary environment. Notice however, that dropping the inflation dummy does not alter the main results, only the growth of GDP becomes significant.
The provision of wireless service by the public telephone firm seems to increase profitability. As we will see later, there is strong evidence of economies of scope of joint production of fixed and wireless telephony. This may explain the higher profits of firms providing these services. Using the return on assets however, there appears to be no relation. On the other hand the existence of a wireless firm in the local market does not harm the profitability of the public telephone firm. 
Productive efficiency
Due to limited data at the firm-level, productive efficiency is measured using three indicators of labor productivity: real sales per employee; real earnings per employee, and fixed lines per employee. Several cross-country studies on privatization compare average labor productivity in a 3-year period before privatization [t-3 to t-1] with the average in a 3-year period after privatization [t+1 to t+3], where "t" is the year of privatization. If the value for the post privatization period is higher and statistically significant, the conclusion is that privatization is related with higher productive efficiency (Megginson et al 1994; Boubakri et al 1998; D'Souza et al 1999) . Applying this same method but just to state-controlled telephone firms, it can be shown that no matter what year is chosen as reference (t), on average, labor productivity is lower in the earlier period [t-3 to t-1] than in the later period [t+1 to t+3]. In short, there is a trend.
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There is nothing surprising about this; as economic growth proceeds, improvements in labor productivity are expected. This is the result of advances in telecommunication technology that lower unit cost of production or increases in capital-labor ratio due to the substitution of capital for labor in the production of telecommunication services. Of course, privatized firms also increased their labor productivity. Indeed, the average increase in labor productivity is considerably higher than in state controlled firms suggesting a positive effect of private control on productive efficiency.
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Regression results
The results in table 4 confirm that privately controlled firms exhibit higher productive efficiency. These results provide strong support for the property rights theory of the firm as they are obtained after controlling for monopoly conditions, the scale of the fixed network, and income per capita. This conclusion is strengthened even further if one takes into account that these firms operate in less developed countries where private property rights are attenuated compared to high income countries. Thus, it provides a powerful endorsement to the selling of state-owned firms in less developed countries even in heavy regulated industries.
[ Table 4 about here]
The results also support, albeit less strongly, the assertion that monopoly firm exhibit lower productive efficiency than those facing competition. The results are highly significant for the fixed lines per employee indicator, but not in the other two indicators of productivity. Although not significant the positive sign of the earnings per employee indicator of productivity deserves some explanation. This may be the result of two opposing effects: the positive effect of monopoly conditions which will increase profits, or in this case EBIT (earnings before interest and taxes); the negative effect of monopoly as it increases the consumption of perquisites by managers. Which effect is stronger is an empirical question. In this case, the effect of monopoly over EBIT appears stronger. In the other two indicators these opposing effects are non existent or less severe. Note also that competition from wireless firms is strongly related to higher productive efficiency measured by fixed lines per employee. Previous findings by Caves and Christensen (1980) , Kay and Thompson (1986) , Anderson et al (2000) , and Boylaud and Nicoletti (2000) stress competition as a major source of productive efficiency. The results here show that competition is indeed important. This is interpreted as supporting both the assertion that product market competition affects positively productive efficiency and that private property rights on the firm also have a positive effect on efficiency.
The provision of wireless service by the public telephony firm is found to be strongly related to higher productive efficiency suggesting economies of scope in joint production of fixed and wireless telephony. On the other hand, the results using fixed lines per employee appear to provide strong support for the existence of economies of scale measured by the number of fixed lines in service. However, the reverse result is obtained when using the sales per employee indicator. This last result may be confounding the effect of the wireless telephony business not fully captured by the dummy variable WIREL. Traditionally the revenues from subscribers to fixed telephony services were all the revenues in public telephone firms. This has changed dramatically in recent years, revenues arising from wireless telephony subscribers and interconnection charges have become relatively important while at the same time the total level of revenues continued to increase. This boost on total revenue was not accompanied by a parallel increase in fixed lines. Indeed some year exhibit negative growth on fixed lines while total revenues and wireless subscriber continue to grow. This relative stagnation on the level of fixed lines while everything else grows is probably what is being captured by the negative coefficient of the variable LINES in the sale per employee regression.
As explained before, with regulated prices, high inflation may erode quickly the firms' revenues; not surprising, high inflation is negatively related with real sales per employee and EBIT per employee all else equal. The results are fairly robust dropping the dummy for high inflation or changing the variable denoting monopoly in basic services to MONBAS2 (not reported) do not alter the conclusions.
Growth
Prior to privatization, most less developed countries exhibited large waiting lists for fixed lines; a sign of excess demand due to artificially low prices. Thus, if privatized telephone firms realign prices closer to market clearing levels, rapid growth on fixed lines per capita should be observed immediately provided the firm has the resources to do so.
What happens in later years is anyone's guess. The property rights theory of the firm asserts that private firms are more efficient than state controlled, not that they grow faster.
[ Table 5 About here]
With this in mind let us now review our findings. Three indicators are used as proxy for growth of the firm: the growth rate of real sales; the growth rate of fixed lines;
and the growth rate of fixed investment. It is worth noting that while growth of real sales accelerated after privatization in ENTEL-Chile, SPT, and CANTV; it declined in TELMEX and Telefonica del Peru (compared to CPT or ENTEL-Peru). Part of this decline could be attributed to a sharp increase on basic telephony prices just before privatization as governments tried to align prices with market clearing levels. Once the firm was under private control further price increases were less pronounced. The growth rate of fixed assets captures investment in fixed telephony and wireless networks. Thus it is preferred over other indicators such as the growth rate of fixed lines. Moreover, investment in upgrading the quality and capacity of the existing network such as more advances switching technology or fiber optic cables will not be fully reflected when using fixed lines in service as the indicator.
Regression results
The results in table 6 indicate that privately controlled telephone firms exhibit higher growth. This evidence is strong for the growth rate of fixed lines in service. This supports previous findings by Ros (1999) using industry level data. Somewhat surprising, monopoly on basic services is associated with higher growth of fixed assets.
This may be confounding the immediate rapid growth of lines in service in the early years of the exclusive period granted to privatized firms as they quickly tried to satisfy the excess demand prevailing at the time of privatization. 31 Monopoly on basic services however, has no relation to growth when the other two indicators are used (see table 6 ).
Having a wireless competitor appears not related to growth of investment or sales.
However, the industry wide ratio of wireless to fixed lines is negatively and significantly related to all three growth indicators. This is consistent with the explanation advanced before when analyzing profitability: the former dominant telephone firms are trying to catch up with the wireless telephony revolution. Wireless firms offer a large variety of new services in a much competitive environment than the public telephone operators were used to. The dramatic changes in the telecommunications industry are squeezing public telephone firms' profits and are harming their growth. Public telephone operators are reacting to these changes by diversifying. This however, is not easy to do given the increasingly fierce competition in wireless service provision. Future assessments of the performance of public telephony firms will need to take this into account. Constraints of the executive appear to be positively related to the growth of real sales but not related for the other two indicators.
[ Table 6 about here]
Conclusions
The former dominant telephony operators are being subject to increased competition that is reshaping the way they operate. To the extent possible, this article has tried to bring into the analysis the most important features of changes in the competitive environment. Unlike most cross-country studies in telecommunications, this article uses firm-level data to compare the operating performance of state controlled and privately controlled telephone firms. The analysis includes variables to account for monopoly on basic services and for competition from wireless firms. The results support the property rights theory of the firm as private control is related with higher labor productivity after controlling for competition on basic services, competition from wireless firms, the scale of the fixed telephone network and other country specific variables. The strength of this result is reinforced if one takes into account that these firms operate in less developed countries where private property rights are inherently weaker than in high income countries. Despite this attenuating factor, we still observe significant higher productive efficiency under private control than under state control. The results also provide some support to the view that X-inefficiency is higher when firm operates under monopoly conditions. No evidence is found that relates private control to higher profitability and only weak evidence is found that private control is associated with higher investment growth. As expected, monopoly in basic services is associated with higher profits.
1 For example, Ramamurti (1998: 152-153 ) in a critical assessment of the World Bank policies toward privatization asserts: "But the limits of that idea [privatization] when applied to particular markets or countries must also be recognized. As new evidence comes in those limits should be reviewed. As of now, the efficacy of privatization in low-income countries has yet to be established convincingly, and even in middle-income countries, the jury is still out on the long-term results of privatization in industries characterized by externalities, long payback periods, subsidies, and messy regulation. (visited Nov. 6, 2000) . 9 At privatization, Argentina granted a seven-year exclusive period to Telecom and Telefonica, later this was increased by two more years. MATAV was granted eight years; CANTV and TELMEX were granted six years; Telefonica del Peru, and SPT were granted five years, and RomTel was granted four years. In Jamaica, Cables & Wireless engaged in a prolonged dispute with the government over the terms of the 25-year license for basic telephony granted to its predecessor, Telecommunications of Jamaica. In 1999 both parties agreed to open the market to competition by 2003. 10 According to OSIPTEL, the Peruvian regulator for the telecommunication sector, before privatization, "The price of services of the telecommunications firms, as the rest of state-owned enterprises, were not set by a pre-established technical method, but rather by political considerations." OSIPTEL. La Transformación de las Telecomunicaciones en el Perú: Memoria 1994 . Lima (1995 . A similar situation was that of ENTEL in Argentina prior to its privatization (Shaikh et al, 1996, p. 76, 90) . For Mexico before the privatization of TELMEX see Galal et al (1994, p. 437 This method adjusts the prices of a basket of basic telephony services by the general price index minus a productivity factor. 12 Four years after privatization the Ministry of Transport and Communications acknowledge that price rebalancing has been delayed. "In the past, the prices, especially of public telephone services, were significantly distorted…(…)…This price distortion resulted in cross financing. These distortions are currently being rectified." National Telecommunications Policy of the Czech Republic, Ministry of Transport and Communications (April 26, 1999, p. 21-22) . The Economist Intelligence Unit reported that "The company came under fire at the turn of the year when it sought to rebalance -to raise its domestic tariffs in line with a rise in costs...(…)…it even looked as if the country's largest single foreign investment might be undone." SPT's Line Management, Economist Intelligence Unit, Viewswire (Mar. 22, 1999) . 13 "CANTV is taking the Chavez administration to court. The Venezuelan telecoms company, controlled by GTE (U.S.) will appeal to the Supreme Court to reverse a government imposed tariff freeze." Economist Intelligence Unit, Business Latin America. Telecoms: Venezuela (Aug. 9, 1999 Competition Rings Forth. June 19, 2000) . 21 In Argentina, the government deliberately let the prices of services from state-owned enterprises lag behind the general price increase as a way to curb inflation. The consequences of this on ENTEL were negative profits for the years 1985 years , 1986 years and 1989 years (Shaikh et al, 1996 . A similar situation occurred in Peru, where ENTEL-Peru posted negative after tax profits for the years 1988 and 1989 (EntelPeru Annual Report, 1988 , and 1989 URBAN Percent of population living in urban areas (%).
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